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PRODUCT LIABILITY AND PRESCRIPTION DIET
DRUG COCKTAIL, FEN-PHEN: A HARD
COMBINATION TO SWALLOW
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT ROLE IS PRESCRIBED TO THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY - REGULATOR OR BABYSITTER?
The American public places its trust in the Food and Drug Admini-
stration (FDA), pharmaceutical manufacturers, and physicians to pro-
vide safe -treatment for physical and mental ailments.' However, past and
current events remind us that the health care industry is far from perfect.
Although the pharmaceutical industry is developing at a rapid pace, and
society is benefiting greatly from technological advances, the result of
this growth is that the health care industry is vulnerable to any liability
that may arise from introductory pilot drug therapies.2
One area of health care that has been particularly active for the past
decade has been the diet industry. As an adjunct, or perhaps a substitute
for exercise and healthful eating, appetite-suppressing drugs are relent-
lessly marketed.3 One of the most popular appetite suppressants mar-
keted during the last decade was a combination of two drugs, Fenflura-
mine and Phentermine, 4 more popularly known as Fen-phen. 5 Millions
I. See generally Product Jurisdiction, 21 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.10 (1997) (de-
scribing the regulatory jurisdiction the FDA has over products entered into the
market for consumer use).
2. ,See generally Michael Lemonick, The Mood Molecule, TIME, Sept. 29,
1997, at 75 (discussing medical advances as researchers learn more about the
chemicals in the brain). See also generally Frederick Golden, Who's to Blame for
Redux and Fenfluramine?, TIME, Sept. 29, 1997, at 78 (naming all the possible
defendants from the health care industry).
3. See, e.g., About Phen-Fen [sic] (visited Sept. 16, 1997)
<http://www.phen-fen.com> ("The Amazing Phen-Fen Diet can help you lose
weight fast:. In fact three times faster than any other diet program. As seen on
Leeza, Mauy Povich, Niteline, and in Newsweek, Readers Digest, [and] Time.").
4. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 78. Fenfluramine and Phentermine are
drugs that target the brain chemical serotonin. See id. at 75. Researchers have
discovered that serotonin plays a major role in the function of the human psyche
including uncontrollable appetite. See id. These drugs stimulate the nerve cells
into pumping out extra serotonin, which makes overeaters feel full. See id. at 78.
5. See NBC Nightly News, Profile: Morton Maxwell, co-director of UCLA
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of patients, ranging from obese to slightly overweight, have haphazardly
ingested this drug cocktail on the advice of physicians.6 Recently, this
medication has fallen under attack because of its alleged connection to
heart-valve abnormalities that could prove fatal.
7
Class action suits are being filed across the nation on behalf of pa-
tients who were prescribed Fen-phen and sustained injuries as a result of
this combination drug therapy.8 These suits will have major ramifica-
tions for tort law in the health care industry.9 Liability for patients' inju-
ries and the legal theory for liability are important issues that must be
addressed.' 0 Special considerations need'to be afforded to the health care
industry and to those involved in its advancement." It seems society
Obesity Center, comments on use of drugs tofight obesity (NBC television broad-
cast, June 5, 1996).
6. See Lawrence G. Prouix, Diet Drugs at a Glance, WASH. POST, Sept.
16, 1997, (Health), at 13. Doctors prescribed "[a]n estimated 6.6 million prescrip-
tions for fen/phen in 1996." Id
7. See Mayo Health O@sis, Two diet drugs pulled from market, Patients
urged to taper offdosage (visited Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www.mayo.ivi.com> at 1.
"Some of those identified with valvular disease associated with fen-phen have re-
quired open-heart surgery, and there have been a small number of deaths reported
nationally." Id.
8. See Golden, supra note 2, at 78.
9. See id. "Lawyers expect many thousands of lawsuits to be filed across
the country. Eventually, the Fen-phen recall could be one of the largest medical
liability cases in history, exceeding silicone breast implants." Id See Tort Binge..
., LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 1997, at 3. "In Washington, two firms... have gathered
more than 100 clients, mainly from the D.C. area, for product liability suits and
other legal actions against the drugs' manufacturers." Id.
10. See Golden, supra note 2, at 78.
Question: Who's to blame for letting the public gobble up poten-
tially deadly diet pills like so much popcorn? Choose from among
the following: 1. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which
brushed off scientists' misgivings to approve the pills last year. 2.
The drug companies that produced, tested and zealously promoted
the pills. 3. The doctors and diet clinics that eagerly dispensed
them, even to patients for whom they were never intended. 4. Un-
critical media that ballyhooed the pills as 'miracle' drugs and
'magic bullets' in the war against at. 5. A fanatically weight-
conscious public so eager to shed pounds that it demanded the
pills at any cost.
Id.
11. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., A Statistical Profile of Pharmaceutical Indus-
try Liability, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1418, 1431 (1994). "It has often been hy-
pothesized that liability awards may depress research and development because
they discourage innovation of new products with unproven designs." Id.
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needs to point its finger at a member of this important industry, such as
the prescribing doctors or the manufacturers in order to establish ac-
countability for the public's safety. On the contrary, society should en-
gage in irLtrospection to identify who is truly supporting the use of diet
prescription drugs and whether the health care industry is solely respon-
sible for the negligent administration of diet drugs.
12
This Comment will provide a simple overview of state tort common
law to predict the outcome of Fen-phen class action suits. While making
this prediction, the analysis will remain cognizant of federal intent
through FDA regulations. First, this Comment discusses the diet drug
industry's development, the media's role, and its effect on weight loss
patients. Second, this Comment discusses the special circumstances sur-
rounding case law involving prescription drug liability. Third, this
Comment identifies past suits in which a patient was injured by a pre-
scribed diug, previously approved by the FDA. Included in this discus-
sion will be descriptions of various defendants joined in the cases, the
different causes of action and defenses, the successes and failures of the
claims, and how the previous law will apply to the Fen-phen dispute and
future diet drug cases. Finally, this Comment discusses public policy
concerning the diet industry's influence on society and the possible
ramifications of that influence on the law, particularly taking into ac-
count a plaintiffs case against those involved in the production and dis-
tribution of Fen-phen. This Comment concludes that because of the me-
dia, societal interaction, and the population's eagerness to be thin, li-
ability for injuries caused by prescription diet drugs should be shared.
The guilty parties include those involved in the health care industry who
acted negligently, and the plaintiff who contributed to the negligence by
placing their most valuable asset, themselves, at risk.
II. BACKGROUND: THE GROWTH OF THE DIET INDUSTRY - A
MATTER NOT TO BE TAKEN LIGHTLY
One woman dropped from 545 pounds to 265 pounds on the diet drug
Fen-phen.13 Some dieters claimed that this miracle drug was the only
thing that has ever worked.14 But another woman who was prescribed
12. See Golden, supra note 2, at 78. "[There are] larger societal questions -
about Ameticans' infatuation with quick-fix remedies for whatever ails them, real
or imagined, and their doctors' willingness to cater to it." Id
13. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 75.
14. See id
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the same drug combination of Fenfluramine and Phentermine died of a
heart attack trying to shed ten pounds.15 The dieting craze that has swept
the United States, spurred by the media, may have contributed to the
dangerous nature of the popular drug cocktail called Fen-phen,16 result-
ing in a ban on the combination use of Phentermine and Fenfluramine.1
7
People are left asking why the ban of such an effective product is neces-
sary.
Cardiovascular health problems have been diagnosed in patients, par-
ticularly women, who were taking the drug to lose weight.'8 This condi-
tion has been attributed to Fen-phen,19 although it has not been con-
cluded that the drugs were causing the particular heart-valve disease
diagnosed. 20 The Mayo Clinic describes the condition of diagnosed pa-
tients by stating, "[t]he damaged heart valves were thickened, 6ausing
blood to flow backward through the valve[s]. The impaired valve func-
tion causes the heart to work harder and can lead to congestive heart
failure.' Some patients identified with valvular disease associated with
Fen-phen have required open-heart surgery. 22 Additionally, there have
been a small number of deaths reported nationally. 23 There was a strong
15. See Sandra G. Boodman, Now that Two Popular Weight-Loss Drugs are
offthe Market, What's Left for Dieters?, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, (Health), at
12.
16. See generally, Mayo Health O@sis, supra note 7 (stating that thirty
percent of patients taking Fen-phen showed signs of heart abnormality and that
these findings call for prompt action).
17. See Paul Rheingold, Fen-Phen/Redux Diet Drugs, 15 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: DRUGS & MED. DEVICES 22,22 (1997).
18. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, "Fen-phen" Update (fenfluramine, phentermine, dexfenfluramine) (vis-
ited Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www.fda.gov> at I (citing N. ENGL. J. MED., Aug. 28,
1997, 337(9), 581-88). Health care professionals presently have reported eighty-
two cases of cardiac valvular disease, only two of which were men. See id
19. See Murray M. Lumpkin, FDA Public Health Advisory, 27 FDA MED.
BULLETIN No. 2, at 1 (1997). "As of July 8, 1997, there have been 33 cases re-
ported to [the] FDA of unusual valvular morphology and regurgitation involving
the mitral, aortic, and/or tricuspid valves, usually being multivalvular." Id
20. See Mayo Health O@sis, Heart Valve Disease and Fen-phen, An Inter-
view with Mayo Cardiologist Heidi Connolly, MD. (visited Sept. 23, 1997)
<http://www.mayo.ivi.com> at 2 [hereinafter Heart Valve Disease].
21. Mayo Health O@sis, supra note 7, at 1.
22. See id.
23. See id; see also Lumpkin, supra note 19, at I ("[As of July 8, 1997]
surgical intervention has been required in six patients."); Geoffrey Cowley &
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enough correlation between Fen-phen therapy and the thickening of the
valves24 to cause the FDA to pull Fenfluramine, commercially known as
Redux©, off the market.25 As many as thirty percent of Fen-phen pa-
tients have shown evidence of heart-valve abnormalities.26 Currently,
three deaths have been reported in connection with the diet drug combi-
nation.27 The other half of Fen-phen, Phentermine, remains on the mar-
ket,28 but inay no longer be used in conjunction with Fenfluramine. 29
Over twenty years ago, Fenfluramine and Phentermine were approved
by the FDA.30 However, the drugs were only approved for medically
diagnosed obese patients to be used separately, and on a short-term ba-
sis.3 1 Furtliermore, the FDA has neither approved nor endorsed the com-
bination use of the drugs. 3 2 Therefore, physicians prescribing the drugs
simultaneously to patients were making an "off-label 33 use of the pre-
scription pills; a perfectly lawful practice.3 The catalyst behind the joint
Karen Springen, After Fen-Phen, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1997, at 47 (reporting that
a waxy coating develops on the heart valves of people with this specific disease and
that the coating can keep the valves from closing properly). The wax build-up
disrupts the function of the heart and can lead to heart failure. See id
24. LSee Heart Valve Disease, supra note 20, at 2. "We say there appears to
be an association between this combination of medications and valve disease, but
we can't prove it based on current information." Id.
25. See Health Update, What's Hot! What's Not! (visited Sept. 16, 1997)
<http://wwiv.members.aol.com> at 1. "The other half of the [fen-phen] combina-
tion, phentermine, has not been taken off the market." Id
26. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 76.
27. LSee John Schwartz, 2 Diet Drugs Are Pulled Off Market, WASH. POST,
Sept. 16, 1997, at Al.
28. S ee Boodman, supra note 15, at 12. It is only the combination of the
drugs prescribed together that causes the abnormal waxy coating to develop on the
valves of the heart. See id.
29. S'ee Health Update, What's Hot! What's Not!, supra note 25, at 1.
30. See Lumpkin, supra note 19, at 1.
31. S ee id.
32. S ee Rheingold, supra note 17, at 22.
33. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 13.
[While the FDA never approved the combined use ofphentermine
and fenfluramine - and the manufacturer warned against it - both
drugs were prescribed together anyway.... The use of unap-
proved combinations of drugs or prescribing drugs for disorders
other than those for which the medicine was approved by the
FDA, is called 'off-label use' and is common practice in medicine.
Id 34. S'ee Rheingold, supra note 17, at 22.
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drug prescription was a 1992 study which revealed that the drugs
worked more effectively in treating weight-loss when ingested in com-
bination.35 Still, the lead deputy FDA Commissioner said, "[t]hese are
drugs that should be taken only by obese patients in conjunction with a
weight loss regimen that includes a reduced-calorie diet and an exercise
program, in accordance with approved labeling."36 The industry and
patients ignored the FDA's recommendations and abused Fen-phen.
III. PRIOR LAW: FDA APPROVED DRUGS - SAFE FOR USE?
A. The Diagnosis for Liability is Found on a
Case-by-Case Basis
Prior cases involving a federally approved drug which later caused
patient injury, have been brought under many causes of action.37 Most
commonly, cases have been filed under tort law theories, and have in-
volved various defendants.S The outcome of this type of litigation is
difficult to predict and is often based on the unique facts and circum-
stances of each specific case. Based on inconsistent determinations of
past cases, which were both similar and dissimilar to Fen-phen, it is
clear that the law concerning tort liability for federally approved drugs
is dependent on fact-specific circumstances.39 Prescription diet drugs
35. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 13; see also Lemonick, supra note 2, at
80. "Because fenfluramine acts on both serotonin and dopamine, it has the unfor-
tunate side effect of putting its users to sleep. That is why doctors came up with
fen/phen; the 'phen' (phentermine) is an amphetamine-like drug that wakes the
patient up again and boosts metabolism to bum calories faster." Lemonick, supra
note 2, at 80.
36. See Public Health Advisory, Health Advisory on Fenfluramine/Phen-
terminefor Obesity (visited Sept. 23, 1997) <http://www. aomc.org/phenfen.html>
at 1.
37. See discussion infra Part IV.
38. See, e.g., Espinosa v. Alford, No. 92-02936 (295th Dist. Ct., Harris
County, Tex., Aug. 1995) (stating plaintiff brought negligence suit against two
different doctors and the pharmacy that dispensed the drugs); Leesley v. West, 518
N.E.2d 758 (I1. App. Ct. 1988) (stating plaintiff brought failure to warn, strict li-
ability, negligence, and breach of implied warranty suit against physician, phar-
macy, and drug manufacturer); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir.
1980) (stating plaintiff brought negligence, failure to warn, breach of warranty and
strict liability suit against manufacturer and doctor).
39. See Annette Marthaler, The FDA Defense: A Prescription for Easing
the Pain of Punitive Damage Awards in Medical Product Liability Cases, 19
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used mainly for cosmetic purposes present very special circumstances
because the specific facts play such a crucial and decisive role in the
outcome of pending Fen-phen litigation. A Fen-phen case will turn on
who the plaintiff is, who is joined as a defendant, and how much infor-
mation the plaintiff was given before starting Fen-phen therapy.
B. Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction for diversity cases with tort liability issues is cur-
rently in flux.40 Although the FDA governs practically every aspect of
the distribution of prescription drugs by pharmaceutical manufacturers,
41
under stale law, a jury may determine the guilt of a manufacturer who
has fully iomplied with the federal law.42 Therefore, state law will only
be supercded by federal law if it is proven that Congress intended for
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDC) to preempt state tort actions.43
This ambiguity of jurisdiction adds yet another variation to the outcome
of tort liability cases in regard to prescription drugs."4 Absent federal
products liability tort law,45 Fen-phen suits may be filed in either state
court or, by operation of diversity jurisdiction, in federal court. The Erie
Doctrine4 ; prevents a plaintiff from forum shopping for the jurisdiction
more sympathetic to his claim. The Erie Doctrine developed from the
case, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,47 where the court held that whether
the plaintiff files in state or federal court, the court must apply the
state's substantive law in which the harm occurred.48 The result is that
HAMLINE 1.,. REV. 451,486 (1996).
40. ',ee David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Product Liability
for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common Law, and Other
Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 398-
99 (1996).
41. See id. at 396.
42. Reeid. at417.
43. (ee id. at 400.
44. For more discussion regarding federal versus state jurisdiction see id.
45. S ee Jeffrey Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration
Regulation and Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 194, 197 (1987). "Although, legislation has been introduced that would estab-
lish a uniform tort law, the law of products liability is still primarily determined
state by state." Id.
46. See generally Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
47. HI.
48. d.
1998]
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factually similar Fen-phen cases may result in very dissimilar outcomes
because different states are certain to have varying theories of law.
IV. ANALYSIS: LIABILITY THEORY IS A HEAVY BURDEN TO
PROVE FOR PRESCRIPTION FEN-PHEN PLAINTIFFS
A. The Possible Defendants
1. The FDA and the "Discretionary Function"
Congress created the FDA to ensure that drugs would only be avail-
able to the public if they were "safe. ' 49 Later, Congress required a
heightened showing that the drugs were "effective" as well. 50 Due to the
FDA's mandate as a government agency, the law developed to shield the
FDA from liability.5' In particular, the FDA benefits from a principle of
law known as the "discretionary function. 5 2 This special exception ex-
cuses the FDA or any federal agency from liability for a tort claim when
the claim is based on the performance or failure to perform a discretion-
ary function solely delegated to that specific government entity.5" For
example, the FDA is charged with the responsibility of regulating
warnings and labels for drugs on the market.54 No drug may be produced
for the public unless the FDA approves the warnings disseminated with
49. See Geiger & Rosen, supra note 40, at 417 (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(b)(I)(A) (1994)).
50. See id.
51. See Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Claims Based on Law Enforcement
and Regulatory Activities as Within 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(A) Excepting from Federal
Tort Claims Act Claims Involving "Discretionary Function or Duty", 36 A.L.R.
FED. 240, 250 (1978). The discretionary function was intended to protect political
choices from being influenced by the private sector. See id at 252.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 250.
The 'discretionary function' exception of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)
renders [a tort claim] inapplicable to any claim 'based upon the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in-
volved be abused,' and was intended by Congress to apply to
regulatory activities of the government.Id
54. See Geiger & Rosen, supra note 40, at 396. The FDA also governs
every aspect of testing, design, manufacture, distribution and detailing specific
duties of manufacturers. See id
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the produot and the label attached to the casing. The test of whether a
tort claim will be dismissed, based on the exception, hinges on whether
the act causing the injury was a judgment based on policy considera-
tions.55 If the injury was based on policy considerations the discretionary
function applies exonerating the FDA from liability. This leaves a case
against the FDA rather difficult to win because almost every activity by
the FDA requires a policymaking component.56 In fact, past cases show
that very few claims against the government have been successful.57
In Gehl'y v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.,5S8 Richard Gelly
brought sait against the United States claiming that employees of the
FDA were negligent and strictly liable under the FDC.59 Richard Gelly's
wife, Carol, died allegedly due to an adverse reaction to the anesthetic,
Xylocaine. 60 The FDA had approved the drug as "safe for use" and had
permitted Astra Pharmaceutical Products to manufacture and sell it.61
However, Carol's cause of death was traced to an adverse reaction to the
approved drug.62 The plaintiff alleged that under the Federal Tort Claims
Act,63 the United States would be liable to a claimant in the same man-
ner as a private person.6 The plaintiff argued that the FDA owed a duty
to provide safe drugs for the market and the agency breached that duty
55. see Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Liability of United States, Under
Federal Tort Claims Act (28 USCS §§ 1346, 2671-2680), for Damages Caused by
Ingestion or Administration of Drugs, Vaccines, and the Like, Approved Safe for
Use by GovernmentAgency, 24 A.L.R. FED. 467,468 (1975).
56. See id. "[T]he effect of accepting the government's argument would
effectively immunize all governmental activity, except the most ministerial acts,
from poten:ial liability." Id.
57. See id. at 467. "[Q1nly a single reported case has been discovered in
which federal court has considered the liability of the United States ... for dam-
ages caused by the ingestion or administration of drugs, vaccines, and the like,
approved a,; safe for use by a government agency." Id. at 467-68.
58. 466 F. Supp. 182 (D. Minn. 1979).
59. "ee id. at 182.
60. See id at 184.
61. See id
62. See Gelly, 466 F. Supp. at 184.
63. S'ee BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 613-14. (6th ed. 1990). The govern-
ment of the: United States may not be sued under tort law without its consent. See
id. Through the Federal Torts Claim Act consent was given making the federal
government vulnerable to tort liability. See id.
64. )ee Gelly, 466 F. Supp. at 184.
1998]
216 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:207
by allowing Xylocaine to be prescribed.65 The United States moved to
dismiss on the ground that there was no actionable tort duty owed by the
FDA. 66 The court agreed, applying the discretionary exception to "ren-
der the government immune from tort liability. '67 The court, interpreting
the Federal Tort Claims Act, stated, "[r]egulatory activity engaged in by
FDA personnel simply has no counterpart in private activity and thus
cannot give rise to liability under the common law., 68
Another challenge to the FDA's immunity came in Bailey v. Eli Lilly
Co. 69 This was a claim against the FDA for negligently performing its
regulatory duties.70 In this case, the plaintiff's decedent died from blad-
der cancer allegedly caused by taking Oraflex to treat arthritis.7' This
drug, like Xylocaine, Fenfluramine, and Phentermine, had been previ-
ously approved as "safe for use" by the FDA.72 The district court deter-
mined that the acts of regulation by government agencies are encom-
passed within discretionary acts and as a result "the actions of the FDA
were plainly of the 'nature and quality that Congress intended to shield
from tort liability."', 7
3
These two cases illustrate the broad scope of the discretionary func-
tion as an exoneration mechanism for the FDA when approved drugs
cause harm.74 Courts have uniformly rejected tort claims against the
FDA that would otherwise provide a civil remedy to a private individual
as a result of injury caused by previously approved drugs.75
In the Fen-phen cases, the FDA would not only be protected by the
discretionary function, but also, the facts of the case might absolve the
FDA from liability. Fenfluramine and Phentermine were never ap-
proved by the FDA for use as a combination drug therapy.76 Rather, the
65. See id. at 185.
66. See id. at 182.
67. Id at 185.
68. Id.
69. 607 F. Supp. 660 (M.D. Pa. 1985).
70. Seeid at661.
71. See id
72. See id.
73. Id. at 663.
74. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
75. See Gelly v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 466 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D. Minn.
1979); see also Rydstrom supra note 51 and accompanying text.
76. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 13.
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FDA only approved the drugs for separate use.7 7 Used individually, the
drugs had caused no health problems. 78 Fenfluramine had been used in
Europe for more than twenty years with no sign of adverse health con-
sequences. 9 In addition, the drugs were only approved for short-term
use.
0
In order for a tort claim to stand against the FDA, a plaintiff must
prove the FDA was negligent, notwithstanding its agency role.8' Even if
the FDA should have known of the heart problems associated with Fen-
phen and 1hat its warning labels were inadequate, it still would not be
liable due to the "discretionary function."8 2 A Fen-phen claim against
the FDA will be almost impossible to win.83 In fact, plaintiffs are so
skeptical of success in a suit against the FDA, the suits that have been
filed thus far have not named the FDA as a defendant."
2. Manrfacturers and the "Learned Intermediary Doctrine"
Drug manufacturers are also possible defendants in cases involving
drugs, previously approved by the FDA, that caused injurysS Often the
plaintiff will want to sue the manufacturer based on the "deep pockets"
theory,86 a belief that a corporate entity will have greater ability to sat-
isfy a substantial judgment, as compared to an individual.87 However,
pharmaceutical manufacturers are protected, much like the FDA,
77. See id
78. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 82.
79. See id
80. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 13.
81. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 468.
82. See Rydstrom, supra note 51, at 250.
83. See Schwartz, supra note 55, at 468.
84. Interview with Rebekah Arch, Associate at Ashcraft & Gerel Law Firm,
in Alexandria, Va. (Feb. 24, 1998).
85. See Barbara Pope Flannagan, Comment, Products Liability: The Contin-
ued Viability of the Learned Intermediary Rule as it Applies to Product Warnings
for Prescription Drugs, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 405, 406 (1986). Prescription drug
manufacturers are encountering the same influx of products liability law suits as
other types of manufacturers. See id
86. See Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis:
Jury Awards for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J.
217, 217-18 (1993). Many jurors believe institutions like hospitals and manufac-
turers have "deep pockets" to provide the compensation for a plaintiff's serious
injuries. See id
87. See id.
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through a protective doctrine called the "learned intermediary
doctrine."8 8 The learned intermediary doctrine states that a drug manu-
facturer must warn the doctor, as a learned intermediary, of any poten-
tial risks relating to ingesting the drug.89 By providing adequate warn-
ing to the doctor, who is in a better position to inform patients of the
risks and benefits of taking a certain drug,90 the manufacturer exculpates
itself from liability in what otherwise would be a breach of the manu-
facturer's duty to warn. 9' The majority of jurisdictions have held that
the learned intermediary doctrine is proper 92 because prescription drugs
are complex medicines best understood by a doctor.93 Physicians have
extensive education and experience, and therefore are best suited to
evaluate all factors of a patient's susceptibility, including a drug's in-
herent dangers. 94 A doctor who has been informed by a manufacturer
can make an informed decision and advise the patient of the best means
by which to treat a condition, whether it be through drug therapy or oth-
erwise.95
Furthermore, if manufacturers were responsible for issuing warnings
directly to the consumer several practical problems would arise.96 In
some circumstances, it could be difficult to make the warning compre-
hensible to lay persons.97 In others, the warning could mislead patients
about the severity of the possible side effects.98 Finally, a direct warning
88. Flannagan, supra note 85, at 407-08.
[L]earned intermediary rule should continue to be a valid defense
in the following situations: (1) where the adverse effects of an
ethical drug involve medical complexities which cannot be trans-
lated into ordinary language; and (2) where warning the consumer
of the drug's adverse effects would amount to a meaningless ges-
ture on the part of the manufacturer.Id
89. See id. at 407.
90. Seeid. at413.
91. See id. at 407.
92. See id.
93. See Flannagan, supra note 85, at 412.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 413. If patients are misled by overly cautious warning state-
ments, or misinterpret warnings as being more severe than necessary, it could hin-
der the progress of medical technology and the progress of that particular patient.
See id
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Flannagan, supra note 85, at 413.
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from the manufacturer to the consumer could be intrusive to the doc-
tor/patient relationship.
99
Because situations may differ according to the specific patient and
prognosis, '[o]verall, the continued validity of the learned intermediary
rule must be determined on a case-by-case basis in light of the merits of
the individual claim." 00 Consequently, there are certain occasions that
give rise to a manufacturer's responsibility to directly warn a consumer
of a given drug's side effects. 10' There may be a federal labeling re-
quirement, such as in some oral contraceptives, where the danger can be
conveyed to the consumer through an inserted warning.102 In this case, a
manufacturer that breaches a duty to warn incurs tort liability and fails
to comply with a federal statute.10
3
There is a significant amount of case law that involves a claim of li-
ability against the manufacturer of a drug. 1' 4 Alleged in these suits will
be a myriad! of claims including strict liability, negligence, and breach of
implied warranty. 0 5 The outcome of these cases is unpredictable and is
dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
In In re Norplant Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation,'°6 a
class action suit involving all of the above claims mentioned, the plain-
tiffs asserted that the contraceptive, Norplant, caused numerous side
effects, such as prolonged menstrual bleeding, headaches, mood
changes, depression, weight gain, hair loss, arm pain, dizziness, and
nausea. 107 The plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer failed to warn
both the doctors and the consumers of these problems.' 0' This failure to
warn gave rise to the other tort claims filed. 0 The court determined that
99. See id.
100. Id at 408.
101. See id. at 415-16.
102. See id.
103. See Flannagan, supra note 85, at 415-20.
104. See generally United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1981);
Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972); McCue v. Norwich
Pharm. Co., 453 F.2d 1033 (1st Cir. 1972); In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods.
Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Co., 609
F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
105. See In re Norplant, 955 F. Supp. at 703.
106. 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
107. See id. at 702.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 702-03 (stating a failure to warn can fall either under negli-
gence theory or strict liability).
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the manufacturer was relieved of liability because the doctor/patient
relationship existed, creating the learned intermediary role, and there-
fore, placed responsibility on the doctors, rather than the manufacturer,
to warn their patients.110 When a physician is aware of possible side ef-
fects of a prescription drug but chooses to disregard the warning, in ef-
fect, the injury is not due to the inadequacy of the manufacturer's
warning. Therefore, there is no breach of the duty to warn."' The court
did note, "[h]owever, ... when the warning to the intermediary is in-
adequate or misleading, the manufacturer remains liable for injuries
sustained by the ultimate user."" 2
An example of another case filed against a manufacturer is Singer v.
Sterling Drug, Inc.13 The plaintiff, Anna Singer, took the drug, Aralen,
prescribed by her physician for treatment of a facial rash. 1 4 After taking
the drug for seven years, she was advised by her pharmacist that the
drug had serious oculatory side effects. s Upon examination, it was dis-
covered that Singer had lost a significant part of her vision due to Chlo-
roquine Retinopathy" 6 caused by the ingestion of Aralen." 7 It was con-
cluded that Sterling, the manufacturer of Aralen, had failed to warn the
physician prescribers of the serious side effects of the drug."8 The court
determined that the defendant manufacturer had a duty to warn and was
strictly liable because it knew the risks of Aralen and failed to warn." 9
The court further concluded that, even in a situation where a doctor is
negligent in prescribing a drug, the manufacturer's liability will not be
vitiated when it has failed to warn the "learned intermediary."'120
110. See In re Norplant, 955 F. Supp. at 705-06.
111. See id. at 711.
112. Id at 703 (citing Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 592(Tex. 1986) (citing Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978)).
113. 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972).
114. See id. at 289.
115. See id.
116. See id. An ophthalmologist diagnosed Singer's visual field as con-
stricted, and stated that her central vision was diminished and her side vision had
been completely lost. See id.
117. See Singer, 461 F.2d at 289.
118. See id. at 292.
119. See id.
120. See id. Although the doctor acted negligently by prescribing Aralen
for long-term use while those in the medical field were aware of its deleterious
effects, the court still determined that the manufacturer would be held liable for
manufacturing and marketing Aralen without adequate warning. See id
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In McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co.,' 2' the patient, Ellen McCue
suffered from a chronic urinary infection.12 2 The physician directed
treatment t:hat included long-term therapy with the prescription drug,
Furadantin. 123 Norwich Pharmacal Company, the manufacturer of Fura-
dantin, failed to warn doctors of possible side effects from continuous
use of this drug.124 Due to McCue's uninterrupted use of Furadantin, she
developed pulmonary fibrosis. 2 5 At the conclusion of the presentation of
evidence by all parties, the jury found that the manufacturer knew that
there was a possible side effect for patients using Furadantin long-term,
aid that the manufacturer failed to give adequate warning to the medical
profession. Subsequently, the jury found Norwich liable for damages. 126
The general rule is that a warning should go directly to the consumer
when a manufacturer is able to convey a practicable and understandable
warning, ailthough this is unlikely in most circumstances.12 7 In the usual
case, there is a duty to warn the medical profession.128 If the manufac-
turer fails in either stipulated capacity, liability may result.
2 9
The manufacturer seems to be the most popular target in the Fen-phen
suits. Around the United States, a wave of litigation has developed for
product liability suits and other legal actions against the drugs' manu-
facturers.13D Even with the learned intermediary doctrine, there remains
some manufacturer liability in the production of prescription drugs. Pre-
suming that the best cause of action for a plaintiff is breach of a duty to
warn, the claimant may include in the suit the manufacturer's failure to
warn of known dangers, unknown dangers, and those dangers that
121. 453 F.2d 1033 (lst Cir. 1972).
122. See id. at 1034.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See McCue, 453 F.2d at 1033.
126. See id. at 1035.
127. See Flannagan, supra note 85, at 421-23.
128. See id.
129. See id; see also United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1052 (5th Cir.
1981).
The distributor of a non-prescription drug must provide adequate
information for use by a layman, for patients are allowed to ad-
mini;ter those drugs without the advice of a physician. The dis-
tributor of a prescription drug, however, must provide adequate in-
formation to the prescribing physician in accordance with the spe-
cific conditions of the [statutes or regulations.]
d .
130. See Tort Binge ..., supra note 9, at 3.
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should have been discovered with reasonable care.' 3' The decisions of
previous cases have been inconsistent leaving the outcome of Fen-phen
claims difficult to predict. In McCue, the manufacturer was found liable
because it failed to warn of the possible side effects of pulmonary fibro-
sis caused by long-term use of the drug.132 The court found the manu-
facturer liable based on the fact that it knew of the danger, but did not
warn of it.1 However, in Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 34
where the plaintiff suffered partial paralysis due to blood clotting caused
by an oral contraceptive, the defendant pharmaceutical company was
entitled to summary judgment because the court said the doctor had been
adequately warned and the warning to the doctor proved there was no
causal relationship between the manufacturer's duty to warn and the
paralysis. 35 Odgers is comparable to McCue because the manufacturer
in both cases knew of the possible side effects; however, in Odgers, the
manufacturer was absolved of liability because it satisfied its duty to
warn. 1
36
In the Fen-phen situation, there were warnings regarding the danger of
the possibility of brain damage and pulmonary hypertension. 137 The
heart-valve defects were only discovered shortly before the ban. 138 The
manufacturers followed FDA guidelines 139 to warn doctors of the known
131. See Richard J. Heafey & Don M. Kennedy, Product Liability: Win-
ning Strategies and Techniques § 10.03[2] at 10-22 (1996).
132. See McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033, 1033 (1st Cir.
1972).
133. See id. at 1034.
134. 609 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 1985).
135. See id, at 867.
136. See id.
137. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 80.
138. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, supra note 18, at 1. As of August 22, 1997, the FDA received 82
reports of cardio-vascular disease in Fen-phen patients. The ban on the drug cock-
tail was imposed September 15, 1997. See id.
139. See 21 C.F.R. § 1.21 (1997).(a) Labeling of a food drug, device, or cosmetic shall be deemed
to be misleading if it ?ails to reveal facts that are: (1) Material in
light of other representations made or suggested by statement,
word, design, device or any combination thereof; or (2) Material
with respect to consequences which may result from use of the ar-
ticle under: (i) The conditions prescribed in such labeling or (ii)
such conditions of use as are customary or usual. (b) Affirmative
disclosure of material facts pursuant to paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion may be required, among other appropriate regulatory proce-
dures, by (1) Regulations in this chapter promulgated pursuant to
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dangers, and there appears to be no evidence to show that the manufac-
turers of Fenfluramine and Phentermine should have known of potential
heart-valve disfigurement caused by the use of the combined drugs.
140
Here, it must also be noted that the drugs were not manufactured jointly,
the doctor was solely responsible for prescribing their use in combina-
tion. Still, a plaintiffs case against the manufacturer may have some
merit wher arguments are posed that more thorough testing should have
been conducted. Possible justifications for better testing are that the
manufacturer had reason to believe the diet drug would be misused, or
that there was widespread use of the drug cocktail and therefore, testing
the combination of the drugs was necessary. In summation, to find the
manufacturer negligent due to deficient warnings, a plaintiff must prove
that: (1) the manufacturer knew that the drugs were not approved for
use in combination; (2) the manufacturer actively marketed the drugs in
combination use for weight reduction; (3) the manufacturer profited
from the drugs combined use; and (4) the manufacturer failed to ade-
quately assure that the combined use was safe.
141
3. The Doctor
In situations where doctors prescribe drugs for patients, courts must
have wide discretion in determining whether the facts truly point to a
doctor's liability through malpractice. The first factor that a court con-
siders is the adequacy of the manufacturer's warning to the doctor.
142
The succes;s of malpractice and negligence claims against a doctor de-
pend upon the adequacy of the warnings. 143 However, once warned by
the manufacturer, the doctor has complete discretion to decide whether
the particular drug is appropriate for a patient. 144 This is especially true
section 701(a) of the act; or (2) Direct court enforcement action.
Id; see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 369.3, 369A, 1302 (providing additional guidelines for
labeling drugs).
140. Lemonick, supra note 2, at 76. "[Cjlinical trials reveal only the most
obvious side effects; the heart-valve changes discovered ... do not initially cause
visible symptoms in most patients." Id.
141. Interview with Rebekah Arch, supra note 84.
142. See Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 852 (4th Cir. 1980).
143. See id. at 860. The court stated, "Dr. Carbo's duty to his patient was
so bound up. in the warnings given by Upjohn, that we do not believe a judgment
against him should be allowed to stand when the record contains error going to the
most fundamental question in the case: the adequacy of the warning." Id
144. See Leesley v. West, 518 N.E.2d 758,763 (Il. App. Ct. 1988).
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when doctors prescribe an off-label combination of drugs. Because
doctors keep drugs in their offices for patients' use, they are clearly part
of the distribution process and may be held liable for misbranding
drugs. 1
45
In Leesley v. West, 146 consumer Sylvia Leesley brought an action
against various defendants for damages resulting from gastrointestinal
bleeding caused by the prescription drug, Feldene. 147 Due to the fact that
the injury was not considered foreseeable by the manufacturer, the court
concluded that there was no duty to warn.14 8 In addition, the learned in-
termediary doctrine applied, and the manufacturer was exculpated of
any wrongdoing. 49 The court then decided that the doctor was not liable
because the manufacturer gave the required warnings to the physician
and the drug was distributed in the usual manner.150 However, a different
court may have found the doctor liable because the possibility of an in-
jury for an individual consumer varies greatly depending on the patient's
medical history and their condition.' 51 Because the doctor is usually con-
sidered the learned intermediary, who possesses the knowledge required
to evaluate the danger of a particular drug, the doctor is vulnerable to
liability. Additionally, physicians who use their expertise to create off-
label uses for drugs place themselves at an even greater risk of liability.
In Espinosa v. Alford,152 a doctor prescribed Bumex, a diuretic, and
Fastin, an appetite suppressant, for a patient who asked for assistance in
losing weight. 53 The patient developed diabetes due to the off-label pre-
scription of these drugs." 4 In this case, the court noted the doctor's neg-
ligence in failing to perform blood work to see if this off-label prescrip-
145. See United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981). Ad-
ditionally, doctors prescribing off-label walk the fine line of dabbling in experi-
mental drugs and may run the risk of lack of informed consent liability. See id
146. 518 N.E.2d. 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
147. See id. at 759.
148. See id. at 760.
149. See id. at 762. "The fact that manufacturers of a prescription drug
cannot adequately evaluate the effect of the drug on any particular patient is one of
the predominant reasons that courts have adopted the learned intermediary doctrine
exempting those manufacturers from the duty to directly warn consumers." Id
150. See Leesley, 518 N.E.2d at 758.
151. See id. at 762.
152. No. 92-02936 (295th Dist. Ct., Harris County. Tex., Aug. 1995).
153. See Verdict in Suit Involving Medications Prescribed to Assist Patient
in Losing Weight, 10 VERDICTS, SETTLEMENTS & TACTICS 366,366 (1995).
154. See id.
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tion was a]ppropriate for the patient. 55 The court was not provided the
opportunitr to rule on the case because the parties settled.,56 Even
though it is common practice, the doctor takes a risk when prescribing
drugs off-label. 5 7
However, not all courts are sympathetic to the plaintiff in off-label
prescription cases. Contrary to Espinosa, the court in Werner v. Upjohn
Co.'58 decided in favor of the doctor. 59 The plaintiff, Jack Werner, was
prescribed Cleocin to relieve a chalazion 160 on his eyelid.161 A known
side effect of the drug was diarrhea. 162 The plaintiff's condition eventu-
ally resulted in the removal of part of his colon and additional opera-
tions to restore his excretory functions. 63 Additionally, the patient con-
tinues to stiffer certain effects from the ingestion of the drug. l6 Werner
brought an action to recover damages, but the court determined that the
doctor's duty to his patient was so intertwined with the manufacturer's
warnings that a judgment against the doctor would be unjust. 65
The success of a Fen-phen claim against the prescribing physician
will depend upon the degree of information the doctor gave the patient
in relation to the possible side effects and/or the dangers of the drug for
that particular patient and his susceptibilities. 66 The physician would
not have been required to warn of the heart-valve problems because they
were not known; however, the dangerous character of the drug, due to
155. See id
156. See Verdict in Suit Involving Medications Prescribed to Assist Patient
in Losing Weight, supra note 153, at 367.
157. See Rheingold, supra note 17, at 22.
158. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980).
159. See id. at 860.
160. James L. Bennington, SAUNDERS DICTIONARY & ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LABORATORY MEDICINE AND TECHNOLOGY 285 (1984).
[Al persistent granulomatous inflammation of a meibomian gland,
which results from occlusion of its duct. It forms a firm swelling
on the upper or lower lid. Initially, it may be indistinguishable
from a sty; however, with progression it can compress the cornea
and distort the vision. Most resolve spontaneously within several
months.
Id.
161. See Werner, 628 F.2d at 852.
162. See id.
163. See id
164. See id.
165. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
166. See Flannagan, supra note 85, at 412.
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the known lung and brain risks, and any possible reservations about a
particular patient taking the combination diet drug therapy, should have
been divulged to the patient.
The FDA took steps to discourage the off-label use of Fenfluramine
and Phentermine. 167 Because of the FDA's clear suspicion of Fen-phen,
it has been suggested that doctors should have done extensive testing on
patients who were prescribed the drug therapy for weight-loss. The tests
should have included an echocardiogram as a way to examine the valves
of the heart. 168 The facts in Espinosa are strikingly similar to those in the
Fen-phen cases. Consequently, because the doctor in Espinosa was
found liable, there is a strong implication that doctors who prescribed
Fen-phen will be liable rather than the FDA or the manufacturers.
One item to note in the Fen-phen cases is that because dieting is so
prevalent in the United States, when these seemingly miraculous drugs
came on the market, weight-loss centers were established all over the
country. 69 In an interview with a doctor, who went bankrupt due to the
ban, the doctor revealed that business was so intense, that authorization
to use Fen-phen was given to patients over the telephone, and often
clinics would forgo proper testing to quickly administer tile diet drug
therapy. 70 One particular doctor blatantly stated that he disagreed with
the FDA's recommendations and believed Fen-phen needed to be pre-
scribed over the long haul in order to achieve weight-loss success. 17 1 In
many cases, doctors simply gave a lecture to fifty to seventy-five "pa-
tients" at a time and then prescriptions were handed out under circum-
stances where the physical exam consisted of only a questionnaire.
172
The feasibility of a negligence claim depends on each patient's expe-
rience with their own doctor. These fact-specific circumstances do not
lend themselves to the class action suits that are being filed today.1
73
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a prerequisite to a
class action suit is that there are questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class. 74 In diet prescription drug cases such as Fen-
167. See Rheingold, supra note 17, at 22.
168. See id. at 26.
169. See Steve Stecklow & Laura Johannes, Dr. Bowen Specialized in Diet
Drugs, Then Helped Do Them In, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1997, at Al.
170. See id. at Al, A14.
171. See id. at Al.
172. Interview with Rebekah Arch, supra note 84.
173. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
174. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
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phen, there are too many variables in each plaintiff's case making it im-
possible for all of the members of the class action suit to have common
questions.
Some of the litigation has been filed under Multi-District Litigation,
which means the cases are tried jointly on causation issues only.' 75
Where factual circumstances differ greatly, this is a more reasonable
route for prescription diet drug legal proceedings. The issue of causa-
tion, whether the jury finds that Fen-phen is the cause of the heart in-
jury, will be common for all plaintiffs. Subsequently, cases may be sepa-
rated depending on the specific facts and circumstances of each plaintiff.
B. The Best Common Law Claim Against Fen-phen
1. Negligence
Establishing liability in a negligence suit against a drug-related defen-
dant will fbcus on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. 7 6 The
elements are much like any other negligence claim: (1) the defendant
owed the plaintiff a duty to act reasonably; (2) the defendant breached
that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual harm; and (4) the harm was
proximately caused by the breach of duty. 177
Previous; suits involving negligence claims and prescription drugs
have been filed against the FDA, the manufacturer of the drugs, and the
prescribing physician of the drug that caused the health impairment. 178
The outcomes of the court decisions are dependent upon the plaintiffs'
ability to prove the elements of the negligence claim.'79 In Smith v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,8 ° a vaccine for diphtheria, tetanus, and per-
tussis was manufactured and marketed by Wyeth Laboratories and ad-
ministered to the plaintiff.'8' As a result, the plaintiff suffered severe
neurological damage. 8 2 The court held that there was no negligence
175. Interview with Rebekah Arch, supra note 84.
176. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 197.
177. See id at 197-98. "The negligence can occur at any point in the
product's lif,.: in designing, testing, manufacturing, or labeling of the product." Id
at 197.
178. See discussion supra Parts IV.A.1, IV.A.2, and IV.A.3.
179. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 197-99.
180. No. 84-2002, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21331 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 21,
i986).
181. Seeid at * 1-2.
182. See id at * 1.
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claim because there was no evidence that the vaccine was manufactured,
stored, tested, transported or handled inadequately.1
83
When considering the Fen-phen case, there are weaknesses that a po-
tential plaintiff must overcome to sustain a negligence claim. Though it
is obvious that there is a duty of care owed to patients by all possible
defendants, including the FDA, the manufacturer, and the prescribing
doctor, whether there was a breach of that duty depends on the circum-
stances of each case and each defendant. The harm is evident, judging
not only from the heart problems diagnosed, but also, the surgeries and
the deaths that occurred. However, whether Fen-phen proximately
caused the waxy coating on the valves is yet to be determined.' s4 Fen-
phen case decisions will depend on the physical evidence of this valve
coating and will eventually turn on whether breach and causation can be
proved.
In reality, most cases will join as many defendants as possible in an
action for damages. For the purposes of this Comment, the FDA will not
be the subject of discussion in relation to causes of action because of its
built-in protection from liability under the discretionary function.'85 The
manufacturer also has protection under the learned intermediary doc-
trine, 8 6 but liability will depend on fact-specific circumstances. Re-
cently, much prescription drug litigation has been centered around join-
ing the manufacturer as a defendant, and therefore much theory has been
developed on manufacturer liability. 8 7 Although the facts will play a
crucial role, the prescribing doctor is left vulnerable to liability, espe-
cially in regard to off-label prescriptions.
The majority of negligence claims against a drug manufacturer allege
a negligent failure to warn of the drug's possible dangers on the label. 88
The FDA imposes certain regulations concerning labeling and
183. Seeid at*10.
184. See, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, supra note 18, at 2.
185. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
186. See discussion supra Part IV.A.2.
187. See Flannagan, supra note 85, at 406.
188. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 146. "An action for negligent
failure to warn offers several advantages to the plaintiff, such as a narrower set of
factual issues and more favorable legal standards. The focus ... is upon the ade-
quacy of the warning in the labeling to the patient's physician, the 'learned inter-
mediary."' Id.
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warnings. 8 9 The FDA, when imposing labeling precautions, balances
the benefits of the drug, against the drug's risks. 190 However, when a
state tort law claim, such as failure to warn, which is often used in pre-
scription negligence cases, is argued, it is premised on the fact that the
labeling regulations imposed by the FDA are faulty.'9' Ironically, these
claims impose liability on those manufacturers that followed codified
law. 192 Notwithstanding this irony, the test imposed to determine the
adequacy of the label is whether the physician, and therefore, the patient
was provided with the detail needed to make an informed decision re-
garding the drug therapy." 3 A plaintiff must prove three elements in a
negligent breach of duty to warn claim: (1) the plaintiff must show the
manufacturer knew or should have known the danger of the drug; (2) the
manufacturer must not have had any reason to believe that those taking
the drug would realize the drug's danger; and (3) the plaintiff must
prove the manufacturer did not take reasonable steps to inform those
taking the drug of its dangerous condition. 194 If the plaintiff proves all
three elements, the manufacturer may be held liable for damages. 195
A failure to warn will most likely be the best cause of action for a
Fen-phen plaintiff to prevail against a manufacturer. This is because the
189. See Geiger & Rosen, supra note 40, at 396; see also supra note 116
and accompanying text.
190. See Geiger & Rosen, supra note 40, at 416-17.
191. See id. at 419.
192. See id.
State tort claims, on the other hand, whether premised on strict li-
ability, negligence, or breach of warranty, are predicated on a
challenge to the correctness of the FDA's decisions and as such di-
rectly conflict with the FDA's determination as to the optimal way
to p:rotect public health. Indeed it is physically impossible for
manufacturers to comply with both the FDC Act and state tort law
when the former requires that a drug be marketed and labeled as
approved by the FDA and the latter requires that it not be.
Id at 417.
193. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 198.
194. See Smith v. Wyeth Labs., No. 84-2002, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21331, at *21-*22 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 21, 1986) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 388 (1965)). The Restatement 2d lists the following elements:
(a) Knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to
be dangerous for the use for which it was supplied, and (b) has no
reason to believe that that [sic] for whose use the chattel is sup-
plied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise
reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the
facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Id.
195. See id.
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manufacturer perhaps knew, or should have known, of the possible heart
problems caused by Fen-phen. 9 6 Manufacturers are required to continu-
ally investigate and update the information and labeling of their prod-
ucts on the market; this includes conducting appropriate tests as new
questions arise.1 97 However, it remains difficult to determine the extent
of the manufacturer's knowledge concerning the use of the drugs as a
cocktail because the limited information that the manufacturer provides
on the consumer warning is not representative of all that it knows.1
9 8
Evidence shows that the possibility of heart-valve disfigurement was
never tested or conveyed to doctors or consumers. 99 In addition, the
circumstances show that Fen-phen was touted as a miracle drug by both
the media and prescribing physicians, which could dilute the warnings
that were included in the packaging. 0 Manufacturers benefitted mone-
tarily from the Fen-phen publicity that lured consumers, but did not take
action or responsibility for the possible side effects of the mass con-
sumption of the drug.20 ' Furthermore, before the ban, the FDA required
manufacturers of Phentermine and Fenfluramine to revise the drugs'
labels as well as the patients' package inserts to stress the potential risks
associated with the drug.202 The FDA wanted to ensure that consumers
and prescribers alike understood the potential risks involved in the long-
term use of the diet products.2 3
Although some facts may point to manufacturer liability, the doctor is
also subject to liability in prescription drug cases such as Espinosa.24
The consumer is usually provided limited information on the label,
while the physician is provided with detailed information including ex-
196. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 198-99.
197. See id,
198. See id, at 198.
199. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 23, at 47.
200. See Heafey & Kennedy, supra note 131, § 10.03[1] at 10-12; see also
id. § 10.03[31 at 10-24.
201. See Heidi M. Connolly et al., Valvular Heart Disease Associated with
Fenfluramine-Phentermine (visited Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www.cnn.com/
HEALTH/9707/08/fenphen.report> at 8. Fen-phen manufacturers provided inade-
quate warning for doctors to conduct proper testing for heart problems. See id
Consequently, no routine pretreatment echocardiographic baseline studies are
available for the affected patients. See id.
202. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, supra note 18, at 1.
203. See id at 2.
204. See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
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tensive test data and performance characteristics. 205 The FDA is required
to provide the physician with complete data on the drug to enable the
doctor to fimction as the "learned intermediary. 20 6 In some courts, there
is a presumption that a physician would not administer a drug without
adequate warning, but other courts have left the burden with the plaintiff
to show that the warning would have caused a different medical deci-
sion.207 In the Fen-phen situation, there may even be evidence to show
that the patient, given adequate warning, would still have decided to
take the drug, despite the drug's inherent risk in an effort to lose weight.
This will play an important role in pure contributory negligence juris-
dictions.
208
When evaluating the strength of a Fen-phen plaintiff's case, counsel
should consider whether the warning could be deemed to have been di-
luted by over-promotion, statements by salesmen, and/or language in the
warning.209 Attorneys will also need to review reported scientific stud-
ies, reports submitted to the FDA, and any reports submitted to the
manufacturer to determine if the manufacturer should have known of the
risk.210
2. The Strict Liability of the Manufacturer
Strict liability2' provides that a manufacturer who sells a drug which
is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer will be liable if the produc-
tion of the drug was in its normal course of business and the drug
reaches the c-onsumer without being touched or contaminated. 21 2
205. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 198-99.
206. See id at 199. "[Tjhe duty is a continuing one - the manufacturer
must stay abreast of all new scientific developments during the life of the product
that could require modification of the labeling. Warnings must be continually up-
dated, and appropriate tests conducted when new questions arise." Id
207. See Heafey & Kennedy, supra note 131, § 10.03 at 10-18.
208. Henry Cohen, CONG. RES. SERVS. - THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
American Law Div., at 5-7, (June 20, 1995). There are six remaining contributory
negligence jurisdictions, Alabama, District of Columbia, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, South Dakota and Virginia. See id.
209. See Heafey & Kennedy, supra note 13 1, § 10.03[4] at 10-25.
210. See id. § 10.03[4][2] at 10-26.
211. ]RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
212. Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 199. If a product shows signs of
tampering and is still sold, liability will attach to the seller. See id.
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
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An action in strict liability is designed to alleviate the plaintiff's bur-
den of proving negligence during the manufacture of the drug.213 In-
stead, the plaintiff must prove an inherent defect in the drug to prevail
with a strict liability claim.1 4 Whether a drug case may be considered
under strict liability is determined on a case-by-case basis.21 1 In the
pharmaceutical industry, virtually all products will have an inherently
unsafe aspect to them or a propensity to induce a side effect.216 Fen-phen
was administered to patients with the understanding that it had caused
brain damage in laboratory animals. 217 Redux© had also been linked to
primary pulmonary hypertension that could prove fatal.218 However,
weakening a Fen-phen plaintiff's case is the fact that the heart-valve
problem had never been identified as an issue.219 Furthermore, strict li-
ability will not excuse Fen-phen plaintiffs from the burden of proving
proximate cause between injury and the drug defect. 0 As the facts
stand, there is no definite causal connection between the drugs and the
heart problems. 221 Cardiovascular tests were never run for this pool of
patients before treatment to determine if they had heart problems prior
to drug therapy.2 2 Furthermore, when dealing with an overweight
population, there is always a tendency toward heart problems due to the
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer, or to his property if: (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and
does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the
condition in which it is sold.
Id
213. See id.
214. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 63, at 1422 (stating to
invoke the doctrine of strict liability it is essential to prove the product was defec-
tive when placed in the stream of commerce). See, e.g., Smith, No. 84-2002, 1986
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21331, at *11-*12.
215. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 601 (1996).
216. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 199-200.
217. See Today, Newscast: Florida banning phen-fen [sic] and Redux
because of recent health concerns linked to individuals taking the drugs (NBC
television broadcast, Sept. 9, 1997).
218. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 12. Primary pulmonary hypertension
is also known as high blood pressure of the lungs. See id
219. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 23, at 47.
220. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 199.
221. See Heart-valve Disease, supra note 20, at 2.
222. See Connolly et al., supra note 201, at 8.
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strain on the heart caused by excess weight.223
The manufacturer of the drugs will be completely exonerated from
strict liability if the benefits of the drugs outweigh the risks caused by
possible side effects.224 This balancing test will be a strong defense in
those cases where an obese plaintiff has filed an action. The manufac-
turer may argue that the thirty percent risk of a heart-valve problem is
less risky than if the patient were to remain obese. 225 Another possible
affirmative. defense in cases involving an inherently unsafe product, is if
the manuficturer can prove that "the product is incapable of being made
safe given the present state of human knowledge, but that the product
possesses such a high degree of social need that its use is warranted.2 6
The social need for Fen-phen may be proven by the fact that in 1996,
Americans: spent at least $467 million on prescription obesity drugs,2 7
and doctors wrote two and a half million prescriptions for Fen-phen,
exposing nearly sixty million people to the drugs worldwide by June
1997.228
Historically, courts have avoided deciding cases on strict liability the-
ory.r 9 In light of the fact that diet products are put on the market for the
purpose of alleviating a health problem, there is a general belief that
manufacturers should not be held strictly liable if the risk is
reasonable.2 0 In addition, there is no flexibility for fact-specific circum-
stances under strict liability. The resultant risk of a lawsuit poses a seri-
ous threat that could deter health research.23'
223. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 76. "[M]orbid obesity carries signifi-
cant risks of its own: heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure and stroke." Id
224. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 200.
225. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 23, at 46-47.
226. See 63 -AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability, supra note 215, § 591.
227. See Prouix, supra note 6, at 13.
228. See Golden, supra note 2, at 79.
229. See, e.g., McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965)
(holding plaintiff had no strict liability claim for harmful side effects of an unadul-
terated drug when the prescription was properly filled).
230. See 63 AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability, supra note 215, § 591.
Provi'ded that such products are properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given a seller is not to be held to strict li-
ability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but appar-
ently reasonable risk.
Id.
231. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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a. Doctors, Risk/Benefit Analysis, and Comment k of Restatement
(Second) Section 402(A)
Both the FDA, when approving an unavoidably dangerous drug, and
the physician, when prescribing an unavoidably dangerous drug must
consider risk/benefit analysis.232 In considering the risks and benefits,
the doctor needs to take into account the benefit of the drugs, the pa-
tient's health, and any alternatives such as surgery or therapy that may
be available in a particular situation.rn Clearly, where the plaintiff is
only ten to twenty pounds over the recommended weight, and the physi-
cian has prescribed Fen-phen as a first line of defense to the weight
problem, it is unlikely that this situation will allow the doctor to say
there was no better alternative.
However, risk/benefit analysis lends itself to a common defense for
prescription drug handlers in strict liability suits. The reasoning behind
the risk/benefit analysis is "[t]here are some products which, in the pres-
ent state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended ordinary use. 23 4 The risk/benefit analysis allows a
defense called the Comment k defense and it states that the product was
unavoidably unsafe but still provided enough benefit that it should be
prescribed.235 Comment k defenses can be defeated by proving either the
risk was avoidable through more thorough testing, or the benefit did not
outweigh the danger. Therefore, the claim becomes a negligence
claim.236
In Fen-phen litigation, strict liability claims are likely to fail because
the FDA approved the individual drugs through the normal process,
237
and therefore thought the drugs important enough to be marketed. The
successful strict liability claim occurs where the physician has pre-
scribed the Fen-phen drugs together for off-label use.238 In the Fen-phen
232. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 200.
233. See id. (stating that the risk is warranted regarding the side effects of
chemotherapy when cancer is otherwise untreatable, but the same effects are not
acceptable for one suffering from the flu).
234. Id
235. See id. at 201 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 402A cmt. k
(1965)).
236. See id.
237. See Rebecca Johnson, The Fat of the Land, VOGUE, Mar. 1998, at
488. The FDA narrowly approved the use of Fen-phen in 1996. See id,
238. See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1133 (1996) "[lI]n the
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situation, although the doctors were justified in relying on the materials
from the manufacturer which promoted the combined use of Fenflura-
mine and Phentermine, they should have demanded more thorough test-
ing based on the risk data regarding the lung and brain problems, and the
vast number of patients receiving the drugs. The tests may have revealed
that the benefits of the drugs no longer outweighed the dangers.239
A plaintiff can defeat a Comment k defense with a public policy ar-
gument that the potential harm outweighs the public benefit.240 An obese
patient may not succeed with this argument because there is a significant
public benefit to helping severely overweight people lower their weight,
therefore, possibly saving lives.241 In the case of slightly overweight
individualls, this claim is also difficult to accept because the plaintiffs
themselves were intrigued enough to take the drug. As a factual matter,
the statistics and media coverage prove a significant public interest in
prescription diet drugs.
b. Duiy to Warn Under Strict Liability
Much like the duty to warn under negligence theory, a manufacturer
may escape strict liability if it has adequately warned the doctor and/or
the patient of the risk. 42 Because it is difficult to show that Comment k
does not apply to a specific prescription, a plaintiff usually bases a strict
liability claim on the inadequacy of product labeling.243 Comment j to
section 402A of the Restatement 44 explains this duty as a requirement
of the manufacturer to warn or give directions to prevent the drug from
being unreasonably dangerous. 245 The manufacturer need not warn of the
absence of any duty upon a seller to test an unavoidably unsafe drug for side ef-
fects, there is no duty on such seller to warn of side effects of which he has no
knowledge." Id
239. See Heafey & Kennedy, supra note 131, § 10.03[2] at 10-22. "A
manufacturer may also be liable for failing to warn of known or foreseeable mis-
uses of its product." Id.
240. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 201.
241. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 76 (stating morbid obesity carries
significant irisks including heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure and stroke).
242. See 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability, supra note 238, §§ 1114,
1129.
243. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 201.
244. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 211, § 402A
cmt.j.
245. See id.
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dangers related to excessive or negligent use.246 The test for strict liabil-
ity for duty to warn, much like the test for negligent duty to warn, is
whether the doctor was properly apprized of all the information con-
cerning the drug.247 Courts generally treat both duties to warn as having
the same elements.
248
In Wyeth Laboratories, where the plaintiff suffered neurological dam-
age because of a vaccine, and was denied a negligent duty to warn
claim, the court also denied a strict liability duty to warn claim.249 The
drug had a potential danger even when it was administered precisely as
planned, and the manufacturers rigidly followed FDA procedures for
manufacturing, testing, and labeling.25 0 Fen-phen suits are distinguish-
able from Wyeth Laboratories in that the two drugs used in the cocktail
were prescribed off-label and, therefore, the FDA had no regulations for
the drugs as a combined cocktail
1
.
2 5
In general, the FDA does not want to interfere with the doctor/patient
relationship.252 The question presented is whether the manufacturer had
a duty to test the combination, when the drugs were not originally ap-
proved for the intermingled use the doctors were prescribing. As men-
tioned above, the manufacturer only would have a duty to test if it was
aware of the danger.253 Whether the manufacturer was aware of the
prevalent off-label use of Fenfluramine and Phentermine, and whether it
had come to its attention that the drug cocktail posed a risk to consum-
246. See Smith v. Wyeth Labs., No. 84-2002, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21331, at *22-*23 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 21, 1986).
Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being
unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give direc-
tions or warning, on the container, as to its use ... But a seller is
not required to warn with respect to products .... which are only
dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quan-
tity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality
of danger, is generally known and recognized... The seller may
reasonably assume [the warning] will be read and heeded.
Id.
247. See Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 201.
248. See id. at 201-02.
249. See Smith, No. 84-2002, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21331, at *30.
250. Seeid at*10-11.
251. See Health Advisory on FenfluramindlPhentermine for Obesity, supra
note 36, at 1.
252. See Heafey & Kennedy, supra note 131, § 10.03[1]. For example,
there is concern that mandating direct patient warnings on prescription products
would interfere with the doctor/patient relationship. See id.
253. See id § 10.03[4].
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ers' health, will be matters for the fact finder to determine. In addition,
when scrutinizing the language of Comment j, the law does not impose a
duty to warn in situations where danger is generally known.254 When
applied to Fen-phen, this proposition is not beneficial to a plaintiff's
case because the public had knowledge through label warnings, of the
risk of brain and lung damage caused by Fen-phen and the general
knowledge that these diet drugs were only to be ingested short term as
mandated by the FDA.255
3. Breach of Implied Warranty or Contract
The allegations of breach of implied contract to a prescription drug
case are as follows: "(1) breach of the warranty of merchantability, (2)
breach of an implied warranty, or (3) breach of an express warranty."' ' 6
The Uniform Commercial Code assumes all goods in commerce are
merchantable through an implied warranty.?5 However, a manufacturer
cannot be responsible under any implied warranty to insure against a
particular patient's susceptibility25' because "a prescription drug with a
legally adequate warning does not breach the implied warranty of mer-
chantability even if it causes adverse side effects in some users." ' 9
It may be difficult for Fen-phen users to allege a breach of an implied
warranty because presently, not all users have shown signs of heart-
valve regurgitation.260 In fact, some patients and care givers who have
met with lreat success via the drugs are quite unhappy with the manu-
254. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
255. See Health Update, What's Hot! What's Not!, supra note 25, at 1.
256. Gibbs & Mackler, supra note 45, at 202.
257. See id.
258. See Smith v. Wyeth Labs., No. 84-2002, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21331, at * 18 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 21, 1986).
259. Id at *19 (citing Fellows v. USV Pharm. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 297 (D.
Md. 1980)) (emphasis added).
260. See Lumpkin, supra note 19, at 1.
As Of July 8, 1997, there have been 33 cases reported to FDA of
unusual valvular morphology and regurgitation involving the mi-
tral, aortic and/or tricuspid valves, usually being multivalvular.
About half'of the women were reported to have pulmonary hyper-
tension with their valvular disease. All 33 patients were American
women with a mean age of 43.3 years (range: 35-72), all of whom
had received combined fenfluramine an -hentermine therapy for
between 1 and >16 months (mean 10) before presentation of their
vahular disease.
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facturers' recall. 261 The success of the breach of warranty claim lies
within both, an implied warranty, which may be difficult to prove, and
the breach of merchantability, which is unlikely to succeed, because of
prior FDA approval.
Much like a claim for breach of implied warranty, a breach of an im-
plied contract has logistical problems. The manufacturer never claimed
that Fen-phen did not cause heart problems, it only claimed patients
would lose weight, which occurred in most instances.262
C. Defenses
1. Primary Assumption of the Risk
Under the affirmative defense of primary assumption of the risk doc-
trine, the defendant has not breached a duty of care to the plaintiff and,
therefore, there is a complete bar to recovery. 263 This would apply in
situations where the FDA, the manufacturer, and the doctor have all
followed guidelines as accurately as possible and warned of all known
risks that are applicable to the prescription drug. In the Fen-phen claims,
this defense is feasible because the heart-valve coating was not a known
danger, nor should it have been known. Thus, there was no breach of a
duty when the industry only warned of the brain and lung risks.
264
The data of these specific risks that were involved with Fen-phen
were disclosed to the patients in some cases and, therefore, for those
patients, the duty of care was satisfied.2 65 The patients, especially those
who were only using the drugs for cosmetic purposes, assumed the risk
by utilizing this weight-loss method with the knowledge of its dangers.
A comparison can be drawn to consumers of oral contraceptives, 26 be-
261. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 23, at 47 (stating that the ban
could set back obesity treatment for many years).
262. See Stecklow & Johannes, supra note 169, at A14. Dr. Bowen's
Centers for Medical Weight Loss issued a brochure boasting an "astounding 93%
success rate." Id.
263. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 810 (1989).
264. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 23, at 47; see also Lemonick,
supra note 2, at 80.
265. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence, supra note 263, § 810.
266. See Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Co., 609 F. Supp. 867, 875 (E.D. Mich.
1985).
Whereas a patient's involvement in decision making concerning
use of a prescription drug necessary to treat a malady is typically
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cause, in both situations, the patient was actively involved in choosing
their Own'method and the prescribing physician was relegated to a pas-
sive role.:167 Even though the Fen-phen patients may not have predicted
heart problems, it is likely they were aware that there were safer ways to
shed pounds. Therefore, injured patients assumed the risk of their injury
or of the possibility of injury.
2. Secondary Assumption of the Risk and Contributory Negligence
Generally, assumption of risk operates on two grounds. 2 68 First, the
plaintiff implicitly accepts the known risks of taking Fen-phen. 269 Sec-
ond, it would be unfair to impose liability on a defendant for the plain-
tiffs own negligence.270 Fen-phen was put on the market with the under-
standing that it caused brain.damage in laboratory animals, 27' and was
linked to primary pulmonary hypertension. 2 2 The small-print informa-
tion sheets that are included in the packaging of the pills acknowledged
these risks. 3
Additionally, secondary assumption of risk is similar to contributory
negligence in that it relies on the reasonable person standard to deter-
mine the possibility of shared liability for the plaintiff.27 4 This affirma-
tive defense is jurisdiction-specific, 275 and for some defendants it may
minimal or nonexistent, the healthy, young, consumer of oral con-
trac:eptives is usually actively involved in the decision to use 'the
pill,' as opposed to other available birth control products, and the
prescribing physician is relegated to a relatively passive role.
267. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litigation, 955 F. Supp.
700,706 (13.D. Tex. 1997).
268. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence, supra note 263, at § 810.
269. See id
270. See id
If plaintiff's conduct was unreasonable, the defense of assumption
of risk in its secondary sense operates to bar his recovery for two
reasons: because he implicitly consented to accept the risk, and on
the policy grounds that it would be inappropriate to impose on the
defendant a loss for which plaintiff s own negligence was in part
responsible.
Id
271. See Today, supra note 217.
272. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 12.
273. See Gail Boyer Hayes, Paying a High Price for the Promise of Thin-
ness, WASI. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, (Health), at 15.
274. See id.
275. See id. "Some courts view secondary assumption of the risk as being
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mitigate damages. The cases encompassed by this doctrine involve de-
fendants who have breached a duty owed to a plaintiff who has know-
ingly encountered an injury caused by that breach. 6 In Singer, the court
held Sterling, the manufacturer, strictly liable unless Singer, the patient,
"did affirmatively assume the risk" in taking Aralen for a rash.27 7 This
could be determined by any misuse or misconduct by the plaintiff.278
Secondary assumption of the risk may be a defense for those manufac-
turers who breached their duty to warn. However, in light of other
warnings, these manufacturers can claim that the plaintiffs took a drug
known to be harmful. Some evidence for the defense of secondary as-
sumption of risk rests in the simple fact that professionals in the diet
field have commented that there was curiously little in the way of na-
tional outrage.279
V. COMMENT: A FAT RESPONSIBILITY TO ONESELF
The "discretionary rule" and the "learned intermediary doctrine" are
illustrative of the methods the law has developed to protect health care
industry professionals from frivolous claims. 280 The FDA, drug manu-
facturers, and physicians play important roles in our society and defer-
ence is paid to their good faith judgments.
A successful claim in a Fen-phen case will depend largely on subjec-
tive circumstances unique to the case, including who is the complainant.
Examples of issues that will have a bearing on the success of a case are:
whether the plaintiff followed a doctor's instructions, whether the in-
structions were adequate, and whether the plaintiff read, and understood
the warnings, if there were any.
Another factor in Fen-phen cases is the role of society and the media.
There is a societal pressure to be thin, and women are increasingly
turning to prescription drugs to solve their weight problems.28' The me-
synonymous with contributory negligence." Id See also supra text accompanying
note 208.
276. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence, supra note 263, § 810.
277. See Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc, 461 F.2d 288, 291 (7th Cir. 1972).
278. See id.
279. See Johnson, supra note 237, at 490. "'I'm still waiting for some
reaction,' says Joe Risser, M.D., the director of Clinical Research at the Lindora
Medical Clinics, a group of weight-loss centers located in Southern California...
." Id
280. See discussion supra, Parts IV.A.1, IV.A.2.
281. See NBC Nightly News, supra note 5.
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dia's impact on the desire to stay thin is significant. Its effect is evi-
denced by courts stating that if a manufacturer advertises a drug to the
consuming public, the manufacturer has an automatic duty to warn pa-
tients, not the doctor, thus constituting an exception to the learned in-
termediary rule.282 NBC Nightly News commented in 1996, "[t]he sales
of these drugs have increased 5,000 percent in the last year., 283 The me-
dia binge included numerous web-sites that are now posted with
"TEMPORARILY CLOSED FOR REMODELING" messages, 29 and
the best-selling diet book, THE REDUX REVOLUTION. 285 By saturating
the market with information of miracle diet drugs many inappropriate
candidates sought prescriptions. The media's role supports a plaintiff's
case to some extent in the fact that the advertising could be considered
misleading. However, the media's part in the Fen-phen tragedy may also
be supportive of a defendant's case because the media is representative
of society's, and therefore individuals', overzealous attitude about
weight loss.
The mcdia is not likely to be joined as a defendant in diet prescription
drug suit:;, especially given the First Amendment protections for com-
mercial speech. Therefore, it is unfortunate and unfair that the health
care industry finds itself submerged in voluminous liability as a result of
over-publicity.
A. The Obese
As compared to individuals desiring to shed a few pounds, obesity is
an illness that is more appropriately treated with diet prescription drugs
such as Fen-phen. 28 6 For those who fight a desperate struggle with their
weight just to be healthy, Fen-phen was an answer.287 Medical profes-
sionals still endorse the use of prescription diet drugs to treat the
obese.288
282. See Heafey& Kennedy, supra note 131, § 10.03[1][a] at 10-21.
283. See NBC Nightly News, supra note 5.
284. See Johnson, supra note 237, at 490.
285. See id (emphasis added).
286. See NBC Nightly News, supra note 5 (stating that obesity will be
treated much like high blood pressure or diabetes because, when obese patients
stopped taking the drugs, they immediately began to regain weight).
287. See John Schwartz, supra note 27, at A6. "The diet drugs in con-
junction with exercise and diet programs, have 'given patients a lot of hope, a sense
of optimism about finally getting control' over their weight." Id
288. See Boodman, 'supra note 15, at 13. "'Big, fat people are different.
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An interview conducted with Marge Friel, a five-foot seven-inch,
forty-eight year old secretary weighing' 230 pounds, revealed the posi-
tive results of Fen-phen in weight loss therapy.289 Friel claimed that drug
therapy was the only thing to work and that as soon as she was taken off
the drug she gained fifteen pounds in nine weeks.290 Friel says, "It's a
tradeoff. I may be safer taking those drugs than I am being really, really
heavy. 291 In another success story, Beth Herwig says that after twenty-
nine years of dieting she finally dropped from 545 pounds to 265 pounds
on her five foot four inch frame. 292 Though these women tout Fen-phen
as a miracle drug, it is conceded that the weight loss from taking Fen-
phen will not last unless some behavior modifications are made, such as
exercise and proper diet.293
B. The Chubby
Drug regulators have indicated their desire to keep diet drugs avail-
able simply for those who are seriously obese while preventing their
abuse by people who just want them for cosmetic reasons. 294 Since the
Fen-phen ban, the FDA requires strict wording on diet drug labels, stat-
ing that these products should only be used by the severely obese. 5
One of the most famous Fen-phen cases to attract attention was the
fatal heart attack of the wife of the Mayor of North Miami Beach.
296
Patricia Ann Mishcon had been taking Fen-phen for six months to shed
about ten pounds.297 She received her prescription from an ophthalmolo-
gist running a weight-loss clinic.298 In fact, many doctors freely pre-
They're sick and they have a biochemical defect' that is amenable to drug therapy."
Id.
289. See Cowley & Springen, supra note 23, at 46.
290. See id.
291. Id. at 46-47. "It's a fiasco for patients who have lost weight and im-
proved their health." Id. at 47.
292. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 75. Herwig states, "It's not that I
don't want that Twinkie still... [B]ut before, I would see it, and there was almost
nothing that could stop me." Id.
293. See Hayes, supra note 273, at 15.
294. See Today, supra note 217.
295. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research, supra note 18, at 1.
296. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 12.
297. See id,
298. See id.
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scribed the diet drugs without the proper screening.299 One sympathetic
doctor prescribed Fen-phen as a solution for a woman who had gained
twenty pounds during pregnancy and wanted to shed the weight
quickly.30 She developed pulmonary hypertension and will struggle to
breathe for the rest of her life. 301 Even though the drugs were approved
only for the morbidly obese, it seems that many who do not fit this cate-
gory are being lured by the "drug solution" to lose a couple of pounds,
despite the warnings accompanying these drugs.0 2
VI. CONCLUSION: SOCIETY EATS WHAT IT IS FED
In reality, most plaintiffs will plead all claims that remotely apply and
join all possible defendants in a suit, but very rarely, will the entire suit
be successful. This discussion reveals that class action suits against the
manufacturer, though usually the most monetarily rewarding, may not
be as legally sound as other suits. The prescribing doctors who took the
off-label risks may be the true Fen-phen defendants. But where the
doctor has acted with the best medical knowledge known at the time, the
patient will need to take responsibility for his own actions.
The purpose of this Comment is to reveal both the strong and weak
arguments against potential defendants in litigation resulting from heart
defects allegedly caused by Fen-phen. Perhaps more importantly, this
Comment seeks to raise an awareness of the roles society and individu-
als play jin exposing victims to the dangers of these so-called miracle
weight loss drugs to take the place of exercise and a healthy diet.
In the end, diet and exercise still are effective measures for weight
loss, but "[o]f course, it is not magic. People have to work at it, and
we're a pill-popping society' looking for an easy quick fix."30 3 Physi-
cian, David Satcher, now Surgeon General, still promotes, "[t]he best
approach to combating obesity is through physical activity. 304 Ameri-
299. See Lemonick, supra note 2, at 76. "[M]any doctors went overboard,
giving Redux and fen/phen to patients who were merely overweight, not obese, a
violation of the FDA and drug-company prescription criteria that couldn't help
skewing the risk-benefit ratio." Id.
300. See Hayes, supra note 273, at 15.
301. See id.
302. See id.
303. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 13.
304. See Carol Krucoff, In the Battle of the Bulge, Better Diet and More
Exercise Remain Safe Alternatives, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at 14.
While [exercise] may result in some weight loss - and decrease the
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cans continue to idolize the thin; despite this, over a third of the popula-
tion is overweight and will "swallow any cure that comes along," in-
cluding potentially fatal diet pills. 30
5
The diet drug industry will continue to grow and develop in order to
help those who truly need assistance for weight loss, and in order for the
industry to financially profit. The replacement for Fen-phen is rumored
to be Phen-pro, a combination of Phentermine and Prozac.30 6 Others say,
the new diet drug will be Meridia. 0 7 Generically known as Sibutramine,
Meridia ironically has the same precautionary warning that it should
only be taken by the obese.3 08 Commentators state, "[Y]ou'd think that
drug makers would have learned their lesson. But scientists (and the
public) will probably never let go of the idea that some day a magic pill
will make people thin." 309 Patients need to abandon their search for the
easiest way to lose weight, and determine what is the most practical and
safest way for them to lose weight.
Caren A. Crisanti
likelihood of weight gain - this level of exercise won't make a fat
person thin. Some people are genetically and physiologically un-
able to meet societal standards of thinness, according to an in-
creasing number of researchers who contend that fit and healthy
bodies come in all shapes and sizes.
305. See Hayes, supra note 273, at 15.
306. See Boodman, supra note 15, at 12-13. "[Since the Fen-phen ban]
diet clinics, commercial weight-loss programs including Nutri/System and obesity
doctors have been scrambling to come up with alternatives.. . ." Id See also
Lemonick, supra note 2, at 82 ("[I]n the wake of the Redux-fenfluramine debacle,
it could be many years before the FDA is ready to approve the new drugs.").
307. See Mary Murray, Diet Drugs: The Next Generation, VOGUE, Mar.
1998, at 491.
308. See id.
309. See id.
